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-	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	REPORT	
	information report	CD NO.	
COUNTRY	China	DATE DISTR. 22 May 1951	
SUBJECT	Decisions Reached at Chinese Communist Conference in Peiping and Directive	NO. OF PAGES 2	
PLACE CQUIRED	Issued by South China Sub-Bureau	NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW) 50X1-HUM	
DATE OF NFO.		SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.	
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10	At a military conference in Peiping , Ch	linese Communist authorities	
	a. The Chinese will not attempt to bring the Korean but will prolong the war, to keep United Nations as possible.	war to a quick conclusion troops in Korea as long	
	b. They will try to retain the initiative, however, and attack as often as possible to keep United Nations troops on the defensive, lowering their morale and thus creating dissension between them and their governments.		
	The Chinose will use aircraft to support and protect ground troops regardless of whether United Nations planes bomb Manchuria, to raise morale by reducing casualties among Chinese troops.		
	d. The Chinese will open a new front to dispurse the strength of the United States.		
	e. They will create as many incidents as possible in the Middle and Far Fast to cause trouble for Western Powers involved there.		
	f. The Chinese will attempt to gain the friendship a Indian and Burmese Governments to prevent their c		
	g_{\circ} The Chinese will blockade Hong Kong to force the Chinese demands.	British to concede to	
2.	Following are items from an urgent directive issued b	by the South China Sub-Bureau 50X1-HUM	
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- a. In judging the possibility of a counteroffensive from Taiwan, we presume that before the Korean war goes to the extreme, the Nationalists will not carry out such an offensive.
- b. The key to the Korean war is: American imperialists will not change their policy toward Taiwan unless our air force participates in the Korean war to assist our ground forces.
- c. We will use our air force when our ground forces are under overwhelming pressure from United Nations troops and it is impossible to improve their position; United Nations forces receive a large number of reinforcements; the United Nations increases its naval forces or makes another landing; additional air raids are made over our coastal areas; or when our forces take full control of the situation at the 57th parallel and we have absolute confidence in driving out the enemy, we will take the final measure of strategic air bombardment of the enemy.
- d. Two main objectives of strategic air bombardment are destruction of United Nations supply lines and complete destruction of the Pusan base.
- e. We will use our havy when the Nationalists attempt a counteroffensive and if the United States attempts to reinforce the troops in Korea directly from Japan.
- f. We will mobilize our navy and air forces when America signs a peace treaty with Japan.
- go We will assume an indeterminate policy toward the United Kingdom, since it is not yet time to take a stand toward her. If the United Kingdom unites with the United States in signing a peace trenty with Japan without giving support to China, we will use our air force to bomb Hong Kong.
- h. The time is now ripe for aiding Viet Minh in order to hinder United Nations troops.

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